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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PAST FORETOLD
On February 23, 1993 The Washington Post published an
article entitled, "Tobacco's Last Gasp? Towards a Smoke-Free
Society."1 The article tested the hypothesis that in the near future no
one would smoke in the United States. Its focus was on means: how
would America reach a point when virtually no one smoked? The
predictions ran the usual gamut of policy devices. Although their
order of appearance may be random, the list was as follows: legal
prohibitions on smoking in public, taxes, social pressure, increased
health insurance costs to smokers, and (finally) litigation.
The Washington Post article noted that just one year earlier the
United States Supreme Court opened the door to lawsuits based on
fraud, but that "so far" tobacco lawsuits had been ineffective. 2 It
quoted one lawyer who suggested that, like asbestos, soon the
"floodgates" would open and there could be "hundreds of thousands of
* Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author would like to thank John
Goldberg, Richard Nagareda, and Howard Erichson for their advice and comments. Simon Lee,
BLS '06 and Ryan Micallef, BLS '06, provided invaluable research assistance. This Article was
written with the support of a Summer Research Grant from Brooklyn Law School.
1. Don Oldenburg, Tobacco's Last Gasp? Towards a Smoke-Free Society, WASH. POST, Feb.
23, 1993, at C5.
2. The article was clearly referring to Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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lawsuits."3 What would be the key to breaking the dam? The lawyer
quoted in the article hypothesized that, to get around the fact that
many smokers bought cigarettes after warnings were placed on them
in the late 1960s, the lawsuits would have to identify some way in
which smoking indirectly harmed the plaintiff-such as by
enhancing the risk of disease of the children whose parents had
smoked or by synergistically increasing the risk of other hazardous
substances used by workers who smoked. The lawyer was unsure.
But he made this prediction: "The tobacco industry goes the same way
of the asbestos industry if it has conspired to hide the facts and sweep
them under the carpet."4
Eleven years later the predictions made in the Washington Post
article have unfolded in ways far more interesting than the author of
the article might have imagined. First of all, while America is far
from smoke-free, the decline of smoking in the United States has
continued. In 1993, 24.8 percent of Americans smoked; in 2002, 23.1
percent smoked.5 The most recent figures confirm a secular trend that
began about forty years ago: in 1965, 41.9 percent of Americans
smoked, and since then that figure has steadily declined.6 Legal
prohibitions on smoking have increased tremendously since 1993;
many major cities, including New York, have banned smoking in most
public places.7 Social pressure has also arguably increased, although
one might note that there has been an "anti-anti-smoking" backlash.8
Cigarette taxes have increased, especially in the past two years. On
average, since 1998, state cigarette taxes have doubled to an average
of seventy-three cents per pack, with sixteen states charging more
than one dollar tax per pack.9 State taxation does not tell the whole
story, since at least thirty-five cents per pack of cigarettes charged by
3. Oldenburg, supra note I (quoting Graham T.T. Molitor, president of Public Policy
Forecasting).
4. Id. (quoting Molitor).
5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, State-Specific Prevalence of Current
Cigarette Smoking Among Adults - United States, 2002, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP.
1277, 1278 (2004). The 2002 figures are the latest available to date.
6. Id.; see also Smoking Prevalence Among U.S. Adults, 1965-2000, infoplease.com (citing
a study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/
A0762370.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).
7. "About 1,650 U.S. communities restrict public smoking, an increase of more than 20%
since 1998 .. " Myron Levin, States Tobacco Settlement Has Failed to Clear the Air, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at C1 (citing Cynthia Hallett, Executive Director of Americans for Non-
smokers' Rights).
8 Christopher John Farley, The Butt Stops Here: Threatening to Snuff out Smoking for Good,
the Crusade Against Tobacco Shifts into Higher Gear, TIME, April 18, 1994, at 58 (discussing
"backlash to the antismoking movement").
9. Id.
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the four major tobacco companies (about 90 percent of the market) is
paid to the states indirectly as part of the settlement of a series of
lawsuits discussed below. In summary, as predicted by The
Washington Post, cigarettes cost a lot more than they used to: the
average price of a premium pack of cigarettes has more than doubled
since 1998.10
What about litigation? To state the obvious, so far, Philip
Morris is not Manville. Since 1993 the share price for Altria, Philip
Morris's parent, has increased by about 300 percent. To be sure, at
times the market has had its doubts about the tobacco industry, and
the major tobacco manufacturers have seen their market share decline
from about 97 percent to 87 percent-but they are not bankrupt.
The comparison with asbestos is instructive. First, as with
asbestos, despite initial hopes that class action devices, especially at
the federal level, would allow plaintiffs' lawyers to combine resources
and litigate multiple personal injury claims in a single procedure, the
state and federal courts removed that possibility. 12 However, it is
worth noting that the asbestos industry was not defeated by class
action litigation, as many have assumed, but instead by the
aggregation of individual personal injury suits. 13  This has not
happened in tobacco. 14 There have been scores of individual personal
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Compare Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing and
remanding a district court's order that certified a class defined "solely [by] the injury of nicotine
addiction") with Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821, 864-65 (1999) (reversing and
remanding an order to certify a class of plaintiffs alleging asbestos injury). The last remaining
personal injury class action in tobacco in the state courts was decertified in Liggett Group, Inc. v.
Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Engle is currently on appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004). A nationwide
"punitive damages only" class action, In re Simon II Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 57 (E.D.N.Y.
2002), has been certified in the Eastern District of New York, but since this case is unique, it is
not clear what will happen to it as it works its way through the appeals process.
13. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural And Ethical Implications Of
Coordination Among Counsel In Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 387 n.3, 412 & nn. 130-31
(2000).
14. Mass tort litigation, in the areas of asbestos, breast implants, and fen-phen, has largely
been successful because of an unusual degree of informal aggregation (where a majority of
plaintiffs are represented by one plaintiff lawyer). See Erichson, supra note 13, at 393. The
aggregation of individual plaintiffs claims has largely aided the plaintiff attorney by giving
added weight to his settlement negotiations. In the example of tobacco litigation, however, the
tobacco industry still views each case as a fresh opportunity to reargue the issue of plaintiffs
Yault. With the tobacco industry's harder stance on settlement, plaintiff attorneys are less
inclined to take on a large number of individual tobacco claims, with only a gloomy future of
increased costs of discovery (due to a lessening of cost-sharing) and no clear likelihood of a
settlement. Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and
the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 9 n. 31
(2000).
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injury suits brought against the tobacco industry and a handful of
victories, but there has been neither a flood of successful personal
injury suits nor a practice of aggregation of individual personal injury
suits, as with asbestos.1 5 Furthermore, with the recent decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court in State Farm v. Campbell, the threat of punitive
damages in individual cases has been severely limited. 16 For the
moment, it seems that although the threat of personal injury litigation
may never disappear altogether from the tobacco industry's business
environment, it will be able to manage the threat.
The disanalogy with asbestos goes much deeper. While the
tobacco industry did not face a flood of personal injury litigation, it did
encounter a form of litigation that no one could predict in 1993. From
1994 to 1998, the industry faced an unprecedented spate of lawsuits
brought by a variety of third parties who claimed that they were
harmed financially by the sale of cigarettes. As shall be explored
below, these suits were brought under a number of theories; however,
the core claim was ultimately that the plaintiffs-usually a health
insurer like a state's Blue Cross/Blue Shield program or the state's
Medicaid-were victims of wrongs that caused pecuniary losses.
Further complicating the analysis is the fact that these claims were
never tested before a jury (only one suit, Minnesota's, came close to
verdict) and were almost never reviewed by an appellate court on
questions of law. Nevertheless, these suits resulted in a spectacular
settlement: an agreement by the four major tobacco companies to pay
approximately $250 billion to the individual states in the United
States over twenty-five years. 7
15. For example, this year in New York, a plaintiff was awarded $175,000 in compensatory
damages and $8 million in punitive damages in a wrongful death suit against Brown and
Williamson. William Glaberson, $8 Million Award to Widow Punishes Tobacco Company, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at B1. It is likely the punitive damage award will be reduced. See infra
note 16.
16. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (striking down a
jury's $145 million punitive damages award as violative of Due Process in a case where trial
court had reduced plaintiffs compensatory damages award from $2.6 million to $1 million); see
also Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr.3d 29, 38-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (reducing $25
million punitive damage award to $9 million in case where plaintiff received $1.5 million in
compensatory damages); Boeken v. Philip Morris, 122 Cal. App. 4th 684, 692-93 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (further reducing a jury's $3 billion punitive damages award, which had already been
reduced to $100 million by the trial court, to $50 million, in a case where the plaintiff received
only $5.5 million in compensatory damages).
17. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking,,
42 J.L. & ECON. 575, 577 (1999) (stating that four states settled for approximately $36.8 billion
and the remaining states forty-six states settled for approximately $206 billion through the
'Master Settlement Agreement," for a total of approximately $243 billion); W. KIP VISCUSI,
SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002) (analyzing the settlement)
[hereinafter VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS].
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One might say that the prediction in The Washington Post
article in fact came true, just not quite in the way that the lawyer
quoted in the article meant. After all, a $250 billion dollar legal
result, which has been described as "the largest transfer of wealth as a
result of litigation in the history of the human race," is equal to an
unprecedented flood of individual suits.1 8 But this equation of the
tobacco litigation with, for example, asbestos, would conceal yet
another critical difference between the way in which these two types
of litigation played out. The asbestos industry-an industry whose
mendacity has been well documented 9 -has been reduced to a
collection of empty trusts "owned" by the plaintiffs who sued them but
under the control of the bankruptcy courts. On the other hand, the
position of the tobacco industry vis-A-vis the states who filed the
"flood" of third-party claims is quite different. The states have not put
the tobacco industry out of business, and they do not control the
tobacco companies. Instead, the states are now dependent on the
tobacco industry's continued success at selling cigarettes since the
$250 billion settlement is 90 percent funded by current and future
smokers. 20  As an executive at R.J. Reynolds ironically put it,
"[T]here's no doubt that the largest financial stakeholder in the
[tobacco] industry is the state governments."21 The states understand
well how important it is that tobacco be spared the fate of asbestos.
For example, in two recent cases in which it appeared that the
industry might face bankrupting court proceedings brought by private
litigants, the states came to the aid of the tobacco industry and helped
the industry to blunt legal maneuvers by private plaintiffs that would
have fatally wounded the industry.22
Imagine that we were to write an article in 1993 and make the
following prediction: Imagine that we predicted a future in which
smoking would be increasingly socially unpopular and heavily taxed.
18. Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State
Government: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 564 (2001); see Hanoch Dagan
& James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 355
(2000) (noting that the settlement is "the largest ever").
19. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985).
20. DeBow, supra note 18, at 569 (citing W. Kip Viscusi).
21. Levin, supra note 7, at C1 (quoting Tommy Payne, Executive Vice President for
External Affairs at R.J. Reynolds).
22. States Try to Save Cigarette Maker and Their Own Coffers, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 12,
2003, at D6 (reporting that a majority of the nation's state attorneys general filed a brief in an
Illinois consumer class action seeking to protect Philip Morris from paying the full amount of a
$12 billion appeal bond); John Kennedy, Tobacco Verdicts Light Up Fears; Lawmakers Are Afraid
Settlement Money Might Disappear, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Apr. 11, 2000, at D1 (Florida
legislature capped appeals bonds retroactively to protect tobacco industry in Engle suit).
2004] 2181
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Further, imagine that we predicted a future in which the tobacco
industry would be widely known to have lied about smoking and
would be treated as untrustworthy by all parts of society. Finally,
imagine that we predicted a future in which very few of the people
who smoked in the past received compensation (despite a shared
consensus that the tobacco industry engaged in many bad acts,
including fraud) and that the state governments defended the industry
against plaintiffs so that a steady stream of tax money (overt and
covert) could be collected by the states although very little of that
money was used for the prevention of smoking, smoking cessation, or
the public health. 23
Is there anything wrong with such a state of affairs? The bad
guys (the tobacco companies) have been publicly unmasked; no one
treats them with equanimity anymore. Smoking, which is a legal
habit, is now taxed at unprecedented levels; this seems to be good
public policy.2 4 The only thing missing is any sense of corrective
justice between the smokers and the tobacco industry. The tobacco
industry may have been publicly unmasked, and today's smokers may
be paying higher taxes, but yesterday's smokers are not being
compensated for the wrongful conduct that seemed to form the
foundation of the states' litigation. One could see error in this result
only by believing in two premises: (1) that the tobacco industry had
caused injuries for which they were legally liable when the states sued
them in the 1990s; and, (2) that if they were legally liable for causing
some set of injuries, the parties who have priority on any recovery
would be the smokers, as opposed to the states who brought the
suits.2 5
My sense is that many are pleased that, as a result of the
litigation that resulted in the MSA, the truth about the tobacco
23. Most states seem to have diverted much of their Master Settlement Agreement ('MSA")
payments towards general funds. See, e.g., Kevin Corcoran, Efforts to Reduce Smoking Take a
Hit; Budget Diverts Tobacco Funds to Other Programs, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 13, 2003, at lB.
24. Taxes on cigarettes can be seen as good public policy if we regard a decline in cigarette
purchases and smoking as a sign of good public policy. See Brian Swint, German Cigarette Sales
Drop by Quarter After New Tax, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 14, 2004 (reporting that cigarette sales
have decreased by 25 percent since Germany increased its cigarette tax from three euros to four
euros).
25. See Dagan & White, supra note 18, at 415. Dagan and White posit that government
claims against the tobacco industry are valid based on the theory of legal subrogation, where the
states suffered an economic loss through their Medicaid programs by paying more money earlier
than if their citizens had not smoked. Id. at 365. Therefore, states were entitled to recover the
economic loss from the tobacco industry. Id. Although government intervention is beneficial in
preventing and ameliorating injuries, Dagan and White emphasize the point that governmental
interference with compensatory awards of injured citizens in the name of public good cannot be
"just" unless accompanied by compensation to those citizens. Id. at 415-16.
2182 [Vol.57:6:2177
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industry's conduct was brought to light and has now pervaded both
popular and elite culture. 26 I also suspect that, except for smokers
(and perhaps even a few of them), most people view the increased
difficulties placed upon smokers (especially the high price of
cigarettes) as a good thing.27 Therefore, if we are happy with these
results of the litigation, how should we explain away any anxiety we
might feel over the lack of compensation to past smokers who were
the target of the tortious conduct? One might take the position that,
although the tobacco industry did in fact do some very bad things,
individual smokers are not deserving recipients of compensation
because they contributed to their own harm. I wonder, however, how
many advocates of the state third-party litigation would admit to
thinking this about the smokers themselves. The other position one
might take is that the MSA was a good "second best" solution: since
personal injury cases brought by individual smokers have proven
ineffective, securing legal redress for the states was the only
remaining approach. As a second-best solution, the states'
"third-party" strategy had further attractions. It allowed the lawyers
who brought the suits to introduce extremely incriminating documents
into public view and restricted access to cigarettes by increasing their
price and placing other restrictions on their marketing.
From a practical point of view, the states' third-party litigation
is quite attractive. The benefits it offers-shifting cigarette "policy"
towards a state of affairs where the tobacco industry is discredited and
cigarettes are hard to get-is one that I personally endorse. The cost
of the strategy-that the claims of individual smokers are suppressed
in favor of state entities-might be worth accepting given the benefits.
Yet there may be other, collateral costs that one must consider before
drawing any conclusions about the strategy. For example, one might
want to know more about the legal foundation of the states' "third
party" litigation strategy. Should it matter, for example, that it was
based on legal claims that were almost wholly untenable at the time
the suits were filed? This was, as I shall argue, almost certainly the
case. Given the legal infirmity of the states' third-party litigation
strategy, but its obvious attractiveness given the results it produced,
26. See Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 17, at 4.
27. New York is an example of a situation where the higher prices of cigarettes, combined
with the ban on smoking in bars and restaurants, has lead to an overall decrease in cigarette
smokers and also to an additional decline in cigarette consumption. See Richard Perez-Pena,
New York Taxes and Ban Make Smokers Give Up, scotsman.com (May 13, 2004) (reporting that
between 2002 and 2003, the percentage of adult smokers dropped from 21.6 percent to 19.3
percent - an approximate 100,000 adults - and also noting a 13 percent decline in cigarette




should it matter that was essentially a political solution cloaked in a
legal pretense? That will be the subject of the remainder of this
Article.
II. THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON BIG TOBACCO: THE BEGINNING
To understand why the states' third-party strategy was both
necessary and legally infirm, one must understand the history of
contemporary tobacco litigation. The history can be divided into three
phases. The first wave of litigation sprang from a flurry of early 1950s
articles publicizing the relationship between smoking and lung cancer.
There was a smattering of reports linking smoking to cancer in the
1930s, but by the 1950s such reports were more credible and
widely-read. 28 The earliest plaintiffs brought actions based on this
new information under negligence and warranty theories, though
neither theory proved successful. 29 The greatest challenge to plaintiffs
was not rejection of claims by judges and juries, but instead, that the
vast majority of first-wave cases were dropped before even reaching
trial.30 This was because the plaintiffs were unable to spend as much
money as the tobacco industry, which used a variety of pretrial
litigation tactics to make discovery and motion practice as expensive
as possible. 31
As the first wave of tobacco litigation drew to a close, the
Surgeon General released his pivotal 1964 report that officially
confirmed the hazards of smoking, and the government subsequently
subjected tobacco companies to increasing regulation. In the
meantime, Americans had developed an unprecedented concern with
toxic risk, which was reflected in the products liability boom that
revolutionized the American tort system between the late 1960s and
early 1980s. This boom included high-profile cases in which plaintiffs
argued that exposure to toxic substances like Agent Orange, DES, the
28. MARTHA DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO
POLITICS 9 (2002).
29. Actions in negligence failed because plaintiffs were unable to establish foreseeability, as
illustrated in Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 317 F.2d 19, 40 (5th Cir. 1963). Early juries
largely accepted the link between smoking and cancer, but the Lartigue court refused to embrace
the premise that the industry should have insured against "unknowable risks." DERTHICK,
supra note 28, at 29. In Green v. American Tobacco Co., the Fifth Circuit held en banc that the
alleged unwholesomeness of a product line, rather than an anomalous defect, did not constitute a
breach of warranty claim. 409 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
30. Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 112 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman
eds., 1993).
31. Id. at 115.
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Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin resulted in disease.32 In these cases,
activist judges modified traditional doctrines of tort law and
procedure, especially as they related to causation, enabling victims to
recover at least a portion of the cost of their injuries.33 Asbestos
litigation was at the fore of these cases. The first cluster of asbestos
cases represented the heaviest onslaught of litigation the tort system
had ever faced.
The second wave of tobacco litigation, spanning 1983-1994,
found its roots in asbestos litigation. A team of veteran asbestos
attorneys who gained experience on the link between lung cancer and
cigarette smoking tackled one of the most well-known cases from this
era. 34 Plaintiffs' lawyers believed that by focusing on tort rather than
warranty they could rely on strict liability to concentrate on tobacco's
inherent danger rather than on the foreseeability of harm to smokers.
Tort, however, turned out to have its own pitfalls for plaintiffs. The
victories of the defendants in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. and
Horton v. American Tobacco Co. illustrate how the second wave was
distinct but still not more successful than its predecessor. The
plaintiff in Cipollone brought an action for breach of express warranty
and negligent failure to warn. At trial, the jury found that the
defendant had been negligent in failing to warn before 1966 but also
held that the plaintiff "voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a
known danger," and was therefore 80 percent responsible.3 5  In
Horton, the plaintiff alleged design defect and persuaded the jury that
the design of cigarettes made them unreasonably dangerous, yet
because of the assumption of risk argument, the jury awarded the
plaintiff no damages.
Subsequent to 1994, plaintiffs brought three types of actions in
third wave tobacco litigation: cases by individuals, nationwide class
actions, and state health care reimbursement cases. The third wave
was characterized by a complex interaction between two changes in
32. Plaintiffs' success in these cases (either at trial or settlement) can be seen as part of a
larger pattern through which mass torts became a tool for resistance to corporate power. See,
e.g., THOMAs H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 2-3 (2001); Leslie
Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 853-54 n.18.
33. See PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 178-89 (1985); MICHAEL D. GREEN,
BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 211-14, 217-20 (1996). In some of these cases (DES and Dalkon
Shield), judicial activism seemed justified in retrospect, while in others (Agent Orange and
Bendectin), the weakening of traditional doctrinal rules resulted in a situation where, in
retrospect, corporate defendants who were not the cause of plaintiffs' injuries settled cases
simply to escape the risk of an unpredictable jury verdict.
34. Rabin, supra note 30, at 119. Plaintiffs' attorneys for Cipollone v. Liggett Group
represented plaintiffs in several asbestos cases.
35. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 693 F. Supp 208, 213, 215 (D.N.J. 1988).
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legal strategy. First, plaintiffs began to shift the emphasis of their
claim from the product (the cigarette) to the product's marketing
(lying about the cigarette). The increased emphasis on allegedly
fraudulent acts of the tobacco industry came about partly as a reaction
to the failure of those legal theories that emphasized the defective
nature of the cigarettes as a product and partly out of the increase in
information relating to fraud that the first two waves of litigation
generated.
Third wave plaintiffs had access to evidence of fraud
unavailable to earlier plaintiffs. In the early 1990s, Merrell Williams,
a paralegal working for the firm representing tobacco giant Brown and
Williamson, procured documents containing evidence of the industry's
knowledge of the health risks and addictive nature of smoking. Brown
and Williamson fired Jeffrey Wigand, its head of research and
development, in 1993 after he spent years battling the company's
refusal to acknowledge publicly the health risks of smoking and
nicotine's addictive qualities. Both Wigand's and Williams's
revelations appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,
in Congressional hearings on tobacco, and in the hands of antitobacco
activists. 36 These documents surfaced at the same time as several
executive leaders in the tobacco industry, in Congressional hearings,
denied knowledge of nicotine's addictive qualities. This information
energized individual smoker cases because it gave juries a reason to
ignore the tobacco companies' assumption of risk defense-if the
tobacco industry set out to fool smokers, it was argued, then smokers
could be forgiven for acting foolishly. It also created a new dynamic in
the calculation of damages: in a number of cases, juries indicated that
they thought that smokers still bore part of the blame for smoking,
but they then granted multimillion dollar punitive damage awards to
punish the industry for anti-social conduct. 37
The second change in legal strategy in the third wave was that
plaintiffs attempted to recast their suits as class actions, thus turning
them into mass claims on behalf of all smokers. In the first and
second waves of tobacco litigation, courts determined liability on a
case-by-case basis, whereas in the third wave, cases like Castano v.
American Tobacco Co. combined individual claims and challenged the
36. Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBAccO
184 (Robert L. Rabin and Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
37. Williams v. Philip Morris, 48 P.3d 824, 835, 842 (Or. App. 2002) (upholding an $800,000
compensatory and $79.5 million punitive award); Boeken v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. BC 226593,
2001 WL 1894403, at *1, *15 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 09, 2001) (upholding a $5.5 million




entire industry in tort. 38 The Castano suit alleged a classwide injury
of addiction and also claimed that the tobacco industry had committed
either fraud or negligent misrepresentation when it failed to warn
smokers of the risk of nicotine addiction. Why the switch in emphasis
from cigarettes' carcinogenic dangers to their addictiveness? 39 It is
probably safe to assume that the architects of the Castano suit
believed that addiction was an easier injury to establish on a
class-wide basis than the diseases caused by cigarettes, and hence
they tailored the claim by the class to fit the predominance and
superiority requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 40
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit decertified the Castano class of
nearly 45 million smokers, but kept open the possibility that a
plaintiff class could be certified at the state level. 41 The court noted
two problems. First, the diversity of state laws, especially as they
related to fraud, would make it impossible to define common questions
of law for a single trial.42 Second, the district court that certified the
class erroneously determined that common issues of fact were likely to
predominate the class action. The Fifth Circuit noted that, especially
in a suit based in part on allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation,
the question of individual reliance would probably predominate the
resolution of the whole suit.43
After the Fifth Circuit's denial of class certification, several
plaintiffs filed "son of Castano" cases in state courts, almost all of
38. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
1996).
39. It is an interesting question to what extent the tort system should be available for suits
against manufacturers of addictive substances that are not physically injurious. Imagine, for
example, a product like Nicorette, which was marketed much like cigarettes. There, the
plaintiffs might have brought suit for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, and demanded
compensatory damages (the price of the product) and punitive damages. But it is clear that in
Castano the addiction claim was a hook designed to open up the tobacco defendants to
consequential damages for personal injuries arising from cigarettes' cancerous effects.
40. The shift from alleging tobacco-related injuries to addiction did not mean that the
plaintiff class abandoned the quest for compensation for tobacco-related injuries. The damages
sought by the class in Castano included all the damages one would have expected from a suit
against the tobacco industry: compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and equitable
remedies including "a declaration that defendants are financially responsible for notifying all
class members of nicotine's addictive nature, a declaration that the defendants manipulated
nicotine levels with the intent to sustain the addiction of plaintiffs and the class members, an
order that the defendants disgorge any profits made from the sale of cigarettes, restitution for
sums paid for cigarettes, and the establishment of a medical monitoring fund." Castano, 84 F.3d
at 737-38.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 743 (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996)).
43. Id. at 745-46.
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which were dismissed or remain stagnant in state courts. 44 The
failure of "son of Castano" cases at the state level was mirrored by
their contemporary, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle.45 The Engle
plaintiffs sued the tobacco industry on theories of product liability and
fraud. In 1996, a Florida intermediate court of appeals upheld the
certification of a class of up to 700,000 Florida smokers suffering from
tobacco-related diseases. 46 The issues at the subsequent trial were
whether the industry had engaged in deceptive conduct, whether
cigarettes as designed and marketed were unreasonably unsafe,
whether there was a causal link between the plaintiffs' diseases and
smoking, and whether punitive damages were warranted. The jury
answered "yes" to each question and found in mid-2000 that the
plaintiff class was entitled to $144.8 billion in punitive damages.47 On
appeal, the same appellate court that had upheld the statewide class
certification reversed its 1996 decision and decertified the class in
May 2003.48
As mentioned above, once decertified, individual cases became
rare, and where there were spectacular verdicts, the industry was
confident that it could get the large punitive damage awards reduced
and then pay off the compensatory awards if necessary. 49 The real
44. Rabin, supra note 36, at 188.
45. 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
46. Id. at 42.
47. Tobacco Suit Award: $145 Billion: Florida Jury Hands Industry Major Setback, WASH.
POST, July 15, 2000, at Al.
48. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The
appellate court also held that the trial court had permitted enough errors on the part of the
plaintiffs that the defendants were entitled to a new trial, id. at 465-66, and it held that the
punitive damage award produced by the trial violated the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 470.
49. Since the MSA, the tobacco industry has won twelve cases and lost six. See Peter D.
Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 224, 231 (2002); Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., No. 03-3557, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 223, at *6 (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 2005) (affirming $4,025,000 in compensatory and $15
million punitive award); Boeken v. Philip Morris, No. BC 226593 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 6, 2001)
(awarding $3 billion in punitive damages, later reduced to $50 million); Henley v. Philip Morris,
No 995172, 1999 WL 221076, at *1 (Cal App. Dep't Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 1999) (awarding $1.5
million compensatory and $50 million punitive, later reduced to $25 million); William-Branch v.
Philip Morris, No. 9705-03957 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1999) (awarding $8 million compensatory and $79.5
million in punitive, later reduced to $32 million punitive); Whitely v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No.
303184 (Cal. Super. Ct. March 27, 2000) (awarding $1.7 million compensatory and $20 million
punitive); Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572 , at *13-14
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000) (class action awarding $144 billion in punitive); Ramos v. Philip
Morris Cos., 743 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing an award of $300 million in an
airline attendants' class action for second hand smoke in the case of Broin v. Philip Morris Cos.,
641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Eastman, Case No. 2D03-
2357, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 6421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 7, 2004) (affirming award of $3.2
million in compensatory damages and no punitive damages); Frankson v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 2004 NY Slip Op 50605U, 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2004) ($175,000 in
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impact of the third wave of tobacco litigation resulted from settlement
of the state healthcare reimbursement cases. In 1994, Mississippi
began a Medicaid restitution action against the tobacco companies.
The suit, which was filed in chancery, contended that the state should
recover restitutionary damages from the tobacco companies because
they were unjustly enriched when state Medicaid payments saved
them the money they should have paid smokers. Within a year, scores
of other states filed similar lawsuits using the same claim of unjust
enrichment. Not all states chose to follow Mississippi's legal theory,
however. Minnesota's Attorney General filed a suit in 1994 alleging
that the tobacco companies violated Minnesota's consumer protection
statutes designed to shield consumers from industry fraud and
deception. 50 Minnesota argued that the consumer fraud statute gave
standing to the state to recover Medicaid expenses that had accrued
because of consumer fraud.51
III. LOSING BATTLES AND WINNING THE WAR
To fully appreciate the ingenuity that produced such a
remarkable victory for the opponents of Big Tobacco, one must come to
terms with the way that the state reimbursement claims changed the
legal grounds of their complaints against the industry. The architects
of the Mississippi case, for example, shifted the focus from the harms
caused to smokers to the harms caused to the healthcare system.
They did this for two reasons. First, they believed that by focusing on
the states' losses, the question of smokers' own conduct would be
completely mooted, thus removing the single most important weapon
in the tobacco industry's arsenal. 52
compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages awarded); Thompson v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 00-CV-220555 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 4, 2003) (smoker awarded $1.05
million in compensatory damages and no punitive damages).
50. G.L. Wilson & J.A. Gillmer, Minnesota's Tobacco Case: Recovering Damages Without
Individual Proof of Reliance Under Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 567, 568 (1999). These
acts were the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, the Unlawful Trade Practices Act, the False
Statement in Advertising Act, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id.
51. The Mississippi lawsuit was settled in July 1997 for $3.3 billion over twenty-five years.
Florida next settled its suit with the industry in August 1997 for $11.3 billion, then Texas settled
its suit in January 1998 for $15.3 billion, and finally Minnesota settled its suit on the eve before
the jury was about to render its verdict for $6.1 billion. Following this trend, the Attorneys
General from forty-six states (including the four that already settled) negotiated a $206 billion
industry global settlement in reimbursement for Medicaid and related healthcare costs. Rabin,
supra note 36, at 193.
52. DeBow, supra note 18, at 563.
[T]he states could not successfully frame their claims against the tobacco companies
in terms of either the traditional tort doctrine of subrogation or the codified version of
the doctrine that allows most state governments to seek reimbursement for medical
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Second, and equally as important, by making the state the
plaintiff, all the issues of class certification raised in the Castano
context would be mooted as well, since instead of millions of plaintiffs,
there would be only one. Concerns over common issues of fact, which
doomed earlier class actions to fail the predominance and superiority
tests of federal and state class action statutes, would be finessed. A
state could argue that, although the question of whether a state could
recover against the tobacco defendants might involve contested factual
issues resolvable only through the testimony of potentially numerous
individual smokers, since those smokers were not parties to the suit,
their due process rights were not at issue and there was
no Castano-type numerosity or superiority barrier to the state's suits.
The move towards the single, unitary plaintiff comes with some
risks. The easiest way to describe the risk is that, even if, as lawyers
for the states believed they could demonstrate after exhaustive
discovery, the tobacco companies had lied to smokers and sold them a
product that was deliberately designed to cause injury and addiction,
what standing did the states have to bring a claim? There are a
number of ways of establishing standing. The most obvious would
have been for the states to bring suit under the equivalent of
"contractual" subrogation, a right that they have under state law. 53
However, given the shortcomings of subrogation, the states turned to
other legal theories. 54 Each had its own problems. 55
For example, those states that claimed a right to indemnity
simply misunderstood the meaning of that claim. As stated in Section
expenditures. Subrogation... would put the states in the shoes of smokers -who, as
we know, had uniformly failed in their lawsuits against the tobacco companies up to
that point.
Id. Or, as Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore put it: 'This time, the industry cannot claim
that a smoker knew full well what risks he took each time he lit up. The state of Mississippi
never smoked a cigarette. Yet it has paid the medical expenses of thousands of indigent smokers
who did." Mike Moore, The States Are Just Trying to Take Care of Sick Citizens and Protect
Children, 83 A.B.A. J. 53, 53 (1997).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 367-a(2)(b) (2004) (statute providing for the subrogation
of social service officials in the State of New York for their medical expenditures); 18 N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 542.1 (2004) (regulations providing the same); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 15-120 (2003) (same); 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1409 (2004) (same).
54. Subrogation claims, applied to tobacco litigation, would be vulnerable to the same
defenses that the industry could have raised in the context of individual smoker's suits. The
most significant of these would have been a defense based on the statute of limitations, which
would have begun to run presumably at different times based on each smoker's knowledge and a
defense based on the fault of each smoker or their assumption of risk. William H. Pryor, Jr. et
al., Report of The Task Force on Tobacco Litigation Submitted to Governor James and Attorney
General Sessions, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 577, 589-90 (1996-1997).
55. Dagan & White, supra note 18, at 376 n.90, have enriched the discussion by the
exhaustive review of the same issues.
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76 of the Restatement (First) of Restitution, indemnification may be
demanded where "a person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a
duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another
should have been discharged by the other."56  The classic case of
indemnification occurs in tort, when one party who has a duty to an
injured victim pays that victim (either as a result of judgment or
settlement) and then sues another party who also owed a duty to the
victim for the entirety of the amount paid to the victim. 5 7 The duty to
indemnify cannot arise just because the payor "volunteers" to satisfy
an obligation owed by another.58 This is made explicit in the draft
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Section 26.
It clearly states that indemnification is a duty that arises between
parties who breached a joint duty that resulted in an injury to the
victim, the compensation for which was provided by the one party now
seeking indemnification from the other. 59 Beyond this, the common
law in most states does not permit indemnification except under very
limited circumstances. For example, when the parties are not joint
tortfeasors, Iowa common law only permits indemnification where
there is an express contract, vicarious liability, or the breach of an
independent duty between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. 60 For
this reason, Iowa's Supreme Court summarily affirmed the dismissal
of the indemnity claim. 61
Even if the claim for indemnification could be made sensible as
a matter of doctrine, it would still have put the states right back
where they did not want to be-in the position of having to prove that
the tobacco companies owed a duty to compensate the smokers on
whose behalf the states had expended funds for medical care. The
existence of an obligation between the indemnitee and the victim who
received money from the indemnitor is a prerequisite for the existence
56. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937).
57. WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51 (5th ed. 1984).
58. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 708-09 (3d ed. 2002).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 (Council Draft No.
3, 2001) ("A claim to indemnity or contribution arises when the claimant has discharged all or
part of a common liability. A claim under this Section must be distinguished, therefore, from the
analogous claim that arises when A and B owe independent duties to a third party, C, or when A,
acting with adequate justification, renders a performance to C for which B would have been li-
able to C directly").
60. Daniels v. Hi-Way Truck Equip., 505 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Iowa 1993).
61. State ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401, 405-08 (Iowa 1998); see State
v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96122017, CL211487, 1997 WL 540913, at *10-12 (Md. Cir. Ct May 21,
1997) (finding that the State of Maryland had no right to assert claims on its own name against
the tobacco company for allegedly causing harm to third-party smokers).
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of a duty to indemnify. 62 The tobacco industry could then argue that
indemnification for the entire class of smokers who received medical
care could not be presumed, but would have to be proven on a
case-by-case basis, thus putting the states in exactly the same place
they would have been if they had pursued multiple subrogation
claims.
Many states pled that the tobacco industry assumed a duty of
care to them or other insurance-type entities when they "undertook" to
protect them by offering to monitor and study the health effects of
tobacco use.63 Besides the implausibility of the factual predicate of
this claim (one can interpret the various lies issued to the public by
the tobacco industry as many things, but it is hard to shape them as
promises to the states), the common law only allows standing to
plaintiffs who have been physically harmed as a result of a breach by
a defendant to follow on an undertaking to provide care. 64
A number of states, including Mississippi, sued under a theory
of unjust enrichment. In many states this claim was barred under the
doctrine that unjust enrichment is only available in the absence of any
other remedy.65 In the jurisdictions where it was allowed to go
forward, the claim was dismissed either because courts found that the
alleged benefit conferred by the states onto the tobacco companies was
too speculative to be actionable or was the result of mere
volunteerism. 66 Despite extensive briefing, the unjust enrichment
claim in Mississippi never received substantive review by any court
before the case settled. Professor Douglas Rendleman's exhaustive
review of the claims in equity made by the lawyers working for the
state takes a dim view of the cause of action from the perspective of
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 (Council Draft
No. 3, 2001).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) (stating that "one who undertakes,
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services" for the protection of another person may be
subject to tort liability if such undertaking is performed negligently and causes injury).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965); State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp.
2d 956, 973-74 (E.D. Tex. 1997); State v. Am. Tobacco, Inc., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1997 WL
714842, at *7 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 1997) (no duty to government insurer); Laborers' &
Operating Engrs. Util. Agreement Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 42 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 951 (D. Ariz. 1999) (no duty to nongovernmental insurer).
65. This was the holding of courts in Iowa, Washington, and West Virginia. See infra note
66.
66. See Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No. CL 71048 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1997), at
http://stic.neu.edu/Ia/dec8-26.htm; Philip Morris Inc., 1997 WL 540913, at *17; State v. Am.
Tobacco, Inc., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1996 WL 931316, at *9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996);




Mississippi law.67 As Rendleman notes, the unjust enrichment claim
assumes that the state stepped in to pay an obligation that the tobacco
companies would have been obliged to pay, which is exactly the issue
that the state had hoped to avoid when it abandoned the subrogation
argument:
The plaintiffs first step in unjust enrichment is showing defendant's enrichment as a
benefit. The tobacco companies argue they were not enriched. A defendant must have
"economic benefit" as a prerequisite to restitution.... Only if the tobacco companies
were liable to the smokers for damages would the State's Medicaid payments to the
smokers be an "economic benefit" to the tobacco companies. The tobacco companies
would have been enriched if the State had paid an obligation the tobacco companies
really owed. A restitution-indemnity plaintiff who discharges a duty to the defendant
owed may recover from the defendant .... The State cannot recover its payments for the
smokers' health care costs from the tobacco companies as restitution-indemnity unless
the tobacco companies were liable to the smokers.
6 8
The unjust enrichment argument, as argued in states like Mississippi,
was really the indemnity argument recast all over again, and it bore
all the problems that we saw above in proving that the tobacco
industry had breached its duties to the smokers of the state.
Hanoch Dagan and James White argue that the unjust
enrichment claims were a blind alley that the states should have
never pursued, since the legal basis for their claims was in equitable
(or legal) subrogation. ''69 The key difference between a claim in
equitable subrogation and contractual subrogation is the presence in
the latter of a contractual right granted to the subrogee by the
subrogor to pursue the third party who injured the subrogor for
damages not to exceed the benefit granted by the subrogee to the
subrogor. While many insurers insist that their insureds provide
them with the right of subrogation by contract, the absence of a
contract between insured and insurer does not make subrogation
impossible-it just becomes equitable.70
The difference between the right to indemnification and the
right to equitable subrogation is more difficult to define. The
67. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did
the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 852-98 (1999).
68. Id. at 899-900.
69. Dagan & White, supra note 18, at 374-76 ("We believe that the states had only one
meritorious claim against the tobacco manufacturers, namely subrogation to the claims of their
citizens against the tobacco manufacturers in tort"). Dagan and White also consider the
equivalency of legal and equitable subrogation. Id. at 384.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 cmt. d (Council
Draft No. 3, 2001). Dagan and White use the term "legal subrogation;" however, since they




Restatement (Third) of Restitution draws the distinction by placing
the two categories of recovery in two separate sections: Section 25
(Indemnity) and Section 26 (Equitable Subrogation). The main
difference between indemnification and equitable subrogation is that
indemnitors and indemnitees are joint tortfeasors, while equitable
subrogation "deals with claims between parties whose duties to the
third person are not only independent but may be of different
character and origin."71
Dagan and White think that the courts made many
terminological and substantive mistakes when confronted by the
states' reimbursement claims. In addition to using incorrect
terminology, they argue, those courts that treated the states' equitable
subrogation claims as unjust enrichment claims and wrongly
dismissed the claims simply because there were other remedies
available. 72 This is in accord with arguments Dagan has made
elsewhere about the doctrinal independence of unjust enrichment
claims, which cannot be treated in any detail in this Article. 73 More
important for the current discussion is Dagan and White's view that
when the states filed suits under the banner of unjust enrichment,
they were really asking for subrogation, which is the remedy for a
situation in which there has been unjust enrichment. 74
Dagan and White correctly observe that the reason so many
lawyers and judges, such as in the Mississippi suit, elected to label
their equitable subrogation action "unjust enrichment" was that they
were scared that the invocation of the label "subrogation" would
immediately invite the same panoply of defenses invoked against the
individual smokers whose health care the states had funded. 75 Of
course, as illustrated in the above review of Rendleman's critique of
the Mississippi unjust enrichment suit, the problem of proving a
wrong to the smokers would not have been magically eliminated had
the state cases been properly tried as unjust enrichment claims.
Dagan and White's more precise description of the suits as
noncontractual subrogation merely brings this problem into sharper
focus. The problem with any noncontractual subrogation claim by the
states is that, for the tobacco industry to be obliged to pay the states
for personal injuries suffered by their insureds (the smokers), the
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 cmt. a (Council
Draft No. 3, 2001).
72. Dagan & White, supra note 18, at 376 n.90.
73. HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC VALUES
5-6 (1997).
74. Dagan & White, supra note 18, at 384.
75. Id. at 376.
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states would have to prove that their insureds had good claims in tort.
Except for Florida, which stripped away all affirmative defenses in
state subrogation claims against the tobacco industry, this would
require a factual inquiry into every smoker's knowledge and choices.7 6
Because no court actually tried a case based on legal or
equitable subrogation, it is not clear whether courts would have
required hundreds of thousands of "mini trials" to determine the merit
of affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk, comparative fault
(or contributory negligence) or-because almost all suits alleged
reliance-reasonable reliance. While Dagan and White clearly admit
that the states' subrogation claims would have exposed the states to
the same defenses that bedeviled smokers in individual cases, they do
not discuss whether they thought that the plaintiffs could avoid the
logistical nightmare of trying each defense one-by-one. Instead, they
suggest that given the record up to 1997, the states could not have
realistically claimed that their medical treatments relieved the
tobacco industry of liabilities to 100 percent of all the smokers in all
the states. At most the states could have argued that their actions
limited the tobacco industry's potential liability to around 50 percent
of all smokers, since a little less than half of all smokers had won
trials against the industry. 77
Dagan and White's reconstruction of the unjust
enrichment/subrogation argument is the best case that was never
made for the MSA, but it reveals certain conceptual problems that are
shared with the less sophisticated arguments made by the states
themselves. First, as Dagan and White concede, the question as to
whether the states had a good claim for subrogation as a remedy to
unjust enrichment was "peripheral" compared to the examples they
offered to illustrate the doctrine of subrogation.78 In fact, the latest
version of the draft of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution suggests
that, on balance, the states would not have been able to claim that
their payments for the medical care of their citizens were recoverable
from the tobacco industry. 79 The question of whether the states and
76. Medicaid Third Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 409.910 (1998).
77. Dagan & White, supra note 18, at 376 n.91.
78. Id. at 396.
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 illus. 35
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Apr. 1, 2002). The example involves a union health and welfare fund that
sues tobacco companies to recover monies expended on health care. Id. It is based on two
federal cases that unions brought against the tobacco industry and that were decided in 1998
and 1999 on theories of noncontractual subrogation substantially identical to that endorsed by
Dagan & White. The only difference is that in the illustration the subrogee is a labor
organization with contractual obligations to provide health care as opposed to a government with
legal obligations to provide health care.
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the tobacco companies were "locked together" in such a way that a
court could conclude that any act by the states to ameliorate diseases
associated with smoking should be viewed as an amelioration of
obligations that the tobacco companies owed to others is deeply
policy-driven and highly controversial.8 0
The problem is not just the question of affirmative defenses, as
Dagan and White concede. It is also one of causation. The claim that
the states paid for an obligation that the tobacco companies would
have otherwise owed to the states' smokers assumed that the benefits
that the states gave (or would give) to smokers-health care-
ameliorated damage caused by the tobacco companies' tortious
conduct. Assuming that the states could overcome the affirmative
defenses and establish liability, they would still need to have found
some way to connect the provision of medical care to the reduction of
tobacco companies' liabilities.
For example, unless one can demonstrate that the alleged
wrongful conduct harmed smokers, the restitution claim is unproven.
This causation question takes on different dimensions depending on
how one understands the tortious conduct for which the tobacco
companies would have been liable to smokers. If the conduct was the
manufacturing of a defective product, then although it might be
presumed that the act of manufacturing cigarettes is connected in
some way to various illnesses, questions of specific causation would
still arise. That is, one would still need to ask how many of the states'
insureds who had illnesses that could have been caused by tobacco
actually suffered those illnesses as a result of smoking. If the conduct
was a failure to warn, then questions of causation could be raised as to
whether the defective warning was a cause of the states' insureds'
decision to smoke. If the conduct was framed as the making of
fraudulent statements or the creation of an environment of
misinformation, then questions of causation could be raised about
whether the misinformation was relied upon to the detriment of the
states' insureds, or whether, but for the misinformation, the insureds
would have smoked nonetheless. And how would one prove the effects
of wrongful conduct on smokers except by conducting a factual inquiry
into the effects of the wrongful conduct on individual smokers?8 '
80. Dagan & White, supra note 18, at 393 ("Subrogation should be allowed even where the
parties' interests are not strongly enough locked in to present a core case if there are substantial
concerns for third party effects and as long as there are no significant concerns regarding
subjective devaluation or conflict of interests.").
81. This was exactly the conclusion of the Florida Supreme Court when it struck down the
portion of Florida's highly unusual legislative modification of that state's right to subrogation in
cases involving smokers who received state health insurance, which would have allowed the
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While it might be possible to estimate the scale of damages in a class
action financial injury suit based on statistical sampling, it is not clear
that a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses expended to
ameliorate personal injuries that could ripen into liabilities can be
measured through statistical sampling.8 2
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION AS TROJAN HORSE
In almost all of the various causes of action reviewed above, the
problem of individuation kept reappearing. It threatened the probable
success of the claims not only because individuation was connected
with the presentation of affirmative defenses, but because it placed
the states in the extremely difficult position of proving a causal
relationship between their loss (the provision of medical care) and the
tobacco companies' wrongs. One cannot help but wonder why the
tobacco industry did not view the various indemnification, unjust
enrichments, and noncontractual subrogation claims as winnable, and
therefore worth fighting, as it did in the Engle case in Florida. The
answer may be that the tobacco industry was concerned about a
further set of claims that might have evaded the problems of
individuation: the states' consumer protection claims under various
state statutes.8 3 In the Minnesota litigation, for example, the courts
stripped away all claims for subrogation and unjust enrichment,
leaving the state with only statutory consumer protection and
antitrust actions. Minnesota was one of the early settlements that
helped open the floodgates to the MSA.8 4
While some commentators view the state consumer protection
claims as purely make-weight, I think that the claims, while facially
weak, reflected a potentially significant shift in how courts were
state to forego identifying which recipients of state medical assistance had been injured by the
tobacco industry. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1254
(Fla. 1996).
82. One court is proposing to do just this. See In re Simon II Litig., No. 00-CV-5332, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632, at *167-*179 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2002).
83. State consumer protection claims survived motions to dismiss in Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota, and West Virginia. See Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, No. CL 71048 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 26,
1997), at http://stic.neu.edu/Ia/dec8-26.htm; State v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96122017,
CL211487, 1997 WL 540913, at *10-12 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21 1997); State ex rel. Humphrey v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996); McGraw v. Am. Tobacco Co., Civ. A. No. 94.C-
1707, 1995 WL 569618, (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 6, 1995).
84. See generally Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d 490. The Minnesota case settled literally after the
judge instructed the jury but before they could begin deliberating. David Phelps & Deborah
Caulfield Ryback, Jury Instructions Spurred Settlement Talks, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis & St.
Paul), Nov. 25, 1998, at 1D. According to one news report, the jurors felt angry at having been
usurped and were also surprised by the size of the settlement, suggesting that they would not
have awarded such a large sum. Id.
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beginning to think about the relationship between tortious conduct
and the right to recovery by third-party plaintiffs such as the state. 5
Minnesota's claim, for example, differs little from the claim made by
nongovernmental health insurers under New York's consumer fraud
statute in a case that has currently been certified to the New York
Court of Appeals.86
The question posed by Minnesota's statute, as in New York and
in numerous other states, was whether the issue of the conduct of
individual smokers-which had been the stumbling block in every
type of subrogation as well as common law restitution suit--could be
finessed by eliminating reliance as a matter of law through the
introduction of a statutory consumer fraud scheme. In the Section
that follows, I will examine why the lawyers for states framing their
claims under consumer fraud statutes hoped that the absence of
reliance would be the "silver bullet" that would persuade the tobacco
industry to settle. They created a claim for mass restitution based on
proof of fraudulent intent without proof of reliance or injury. This
claim succeeded to the extent that it provided a legal framework
around which to build the MSA. However, the idea of mass restitution
based on proof of fraudulent intent without proof of reliance or injury
is still incomplete, and the states' litigation has left a doctrinal legacy
of confusion about the limits of this sort of claim. I shall illustrate the
current limitations of mass restitution based on proof of fraudulent
intent without proof of reliance or injury by examining the most recent
wave of consumer fraud cases based on the sale of "light" cigarettes in
Illinois and Missouri.
Of the states that pursued suits under consumer fraud statues,
Minnesota's was the most important for a number of reasons. First,
because it was one of the important early settlements, the legal
theories it used must have been considered by the tobacco industry
when it decided to settle all outstanding state suits. Second, in 1996
the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the state's tort claims and
limited its claims in equity to injunctive relief (including restitution)
only, which meant that the only claims under which the state could
recover for the personal injuries suffered by smokers were the
statutory claims.87  When they went to trial in 1998, these claims
yielded a $6.1 billion settlement. Finally, as we will see below,
85. See, e.g., Dagan and White, supra note 18, at 376 n.90 (States "may" have been entitled
to injunctive relief and "possibly even civil penalties" but it is doubtful they could have recovered
money damages under the various consumer fraud statutes).
86. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir.
2003).
87. Humphrey, 551 N.W. 2d at 498.
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Minnesota's consumer fraud statutes were fairly typical in that they
did not require proof of individual reliance. They thus removed from
the tobacco industry one of its most important defensive advantages,
the demand that the states "individuate" their reimbursement claims.
The Minnesota consumer protection statutes broadly
prohibited deceptive conduct in business and consumer transactions.
The Consumer Fraud Act, for example, prohibited false and
misleading statements and false promises made in connection with
the sale of any merchandise.88 The Unlawful Trade Practices Act
similarly said that "no person shall, in connection with the sale of
merchandise, knowingly misrepresent, directly or indirectly, the true
quality, ingredients or origin" of the merchandise.8 9  The False
Advertising Statute prohibited advertisements containing "untrue,
deceptive or misleading" representations "with intent to sell or in
anywise dispose of merchandise... to increase the consumption
thereof, or to induce the public in any manner... ."90 The Deceptive
Trade Practices Act prohibited a sweeping range of deceptive conduct
"in the course of business, vocation, or occupation." 91
Section 8.31 of the Minnesota Statutes vested in the attorney
general the duty to investigate and enforce violations of Minnesota's
consumer protection laws. 92 The attorney general was entitled to seek
an injunction and civil penalties for each violation of the laws
enumerated in this section. 93  Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, also
created a private right of action. The statute permitted any "person"
injured by a violation of the consumer protection statutes to sue for
"damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of
investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, and receive other
equitable relief as determined by the court."94 The attorney general
was also permitted to bring an action for damages under this
subdivision.
Typically, in common law fraud, the plaintiff must prove that
he or she relied upon the defendant's alleged misrepresentations-
that is to say, that the fraudulent conduct was the cause of the
88. MINN. STAT. § 325F.68-.70 (1998).
89. Id. § 325D.09-.16.
90. Id. § 325F.67.
91. Id. §§ 325F.69, 325D.13, 325F.67, 325D.44.
92. Id. § 8.31, subd. 1.
93. Id. § 8.31, subd. 1-3a.
94. Id. § 8.31, subd. 3. Blue Cross, a health care organization, was implicitly found to fall
under the definition of person when the Minnesota Supreme Court held that it had standing to
sue under all four consumer protection laws. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551
N.W.2d 490, 495-97 (Minn. 1996).
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plaintiffs injury. 9 Like many other states, Minnesota relaxed the
common law's requirement of proof of reliance when it drafted its
consumer fraud statutes.9 6 When it affirmed the state's right to sue
under the consumer fraud statutes, the Minnesota Supreme Court
noted that "these statutes are generally very broadly construed to
enhance consumer protection."97 The court cited State v. Alpine Air
Products, Inc., a case recently decided in which the same court held
the Attorney General did not have to prove reliance when suing under
Section 8.31, subdivision 3a.98 The Supreme Court's decision was
crucial to the state's case. It set the stage for the trial judge's rejection
of the tobacco companies' motion for summary judgment, which was
based, in part, on the claim that the state had not introduced evidence
of individual reliance. 99
The elimination of reliance as an element of a claim under the
consumer fraud statute was not fully established in Minnesota in 1996
or 1997, but it is clear, in retrospect, that the state was not
unreasonable in assuming that the principle could be fairly inferred
from both the language of the statutes and the case law. In fact, in
2001, the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed the proposition in
another tobacco-related case. In Group Health Plan v. Philip Morris,
an HMO sought damages in federal court under the same consumer
fraud statutes used by the Attorney General in 1996, and the district
court judge certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of
whether the HMOs had to plead and prove individual reliance by the
insureds on either the defendants' statements or conduct.100 The court
held that their 1996 decision in the state reimbursement case, as well
95. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 474 (2000).
96. Minnesota's Consumer Fraud Act stated that a false statement must be made "with the
intent that others rely thereon," but a violation is established regardless of whether "any person
has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged" as a result. MINN. STAT. § 325F.69, subd. 1
(1998). Similarly, the False Advertising Statute stated that a defendant is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and the act may be enjoined, if the defendant disseminates a misleading
advertisement "with the intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the public in
any manner." Id. § 325F.67. A complainant under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act did need
to "prove... actual confusion or misunderstanding" before a violation will be found. Id. §
325D.44, subd. 2. And the Unlawful Trade Practices Act contained a legislative finding of
reliance, establishing that "the legislature of the state of Minnesota hereby finds: that the trade
practices defined and prohibited by sections 325D.09 to 325D.16 are detrimental... [and] that
they mislead consumers." Id. § 325D.09.
97. Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d at 496.
98. 500 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. 1993).
99. Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 50, at 567, 570 n.11.
100. Group Health Plan v. Philip Morris, 621 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 2001).
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as Alpine Air Products, held that Minnesota's legislature had not
intended to require proof of reliance in its consumer fraud statutes. 1 1
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged in its
2001 decision something else that should have also been apparent to
the states and the tobacco companies in 1997. It noted that the
elimination of the reliance element by the legislature could not be
understood as an elimination of the requirement that a plaintiff suing
under statutory consumer fraud must prove that the defendant's
attempt to induce reliance caused harm to the plaintiff:
Although we conclude that the legislature has eliminated the requirement of pleading
and proving traditional common law reliance as an element of a statutory
misrepresentation in sales action, the parties are correct that causation remains an
element of such a claim. Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, authorizes a damages action only
by someone injured by a violation. This language denotes a causal relationship between
the alleged injury and the wrongful conduct that violates the statute. Causation is,
therefore, a necessary element of an action to recover damages under section 8.31,
subdivision 3a. Moreover, where, as here, the plaintiffs allege that their damages were
caused by deceptive, misleading, or fraudulent statements or conduct in violation of the
misrepresentation in sales laws, as a practical matter it is not possible that the damages
could be caused by a violation without reliance on the statements or conduct alleged to
violate the statutes. Therefore, in a case such as this, it will be necessary to prove
reliance on those statements or conduct to satisfy the causation requirement. Indeed,
while the HMOs might disagree with the use of the word reliance, they appear to
concede that, as part of their necessary proof of a causal nexus between their damages
and the defendants' wrongful conduct, they must demonstrate that defendants' conduct
had some impact on their members' use of tobacco products that caused their
damages. 102
The courts in Minnesota had noted earlier that, in every case
brought under consumer fraud, the plaintiff had to prove some sort of
"legal nexus" between the conduct prohibited by the state and the
injury suffered by the plaintiff.10 3  Other states that have, like
Minnesota, liberally "relaxed" their reliance requirements, have
reintroduced a "proximate cause" requirement into the plaintiffs
case-in-chief, that, in effect, requires proof that the defendant's
deceitful behavior "caused" the plaintiffs injury in a legally significant
way. 104
101. Id. at 12-13.
102. Id. at 13-14 (citation omitted).
103. LeSage v. Norwest Bank Calhoun-Isles, N.A., 409 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
104. See Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1314 (Mass. 1983) ('This court has
rejected the proposition that a plaintiff must show proof of actual reliance on a
misrepresentation under [the Consumer Protection Act] .... What the plaintiff must show is a
causal connection between the deception and the loss and that the loss was foreseeable as a
result of the deception."); Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank,
647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that while New York State General Business Law
section 349, which prohibits deceptive business practices, "does not require proof of justifiable
reliance, a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages must show that the defendant engaged in a
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The problem with the Minnesota litigation is that the state's
Supreme Court spoke only to the question of standing and reliance in
1996. It did not say anything about whether individualization of proof
would be required to establish proximate cause or the proper legal
nexus. That issue was decided in the negative by the trial judge in the
Minnesota reimbursement case and was not appealed by the tobacco
industry because they settled the case soon afterward. It is, of course,
possible that a plaintiff might still need to prove causation on an
individual basis even if it need not prove reliance under a consumer
fraud claim. In fact, the two questions relate to quite different
issues. 105 A reliance requirement says to a plaintiff that only a certain
kind of injurious interaction is legally culpable-that is, acts, that are
not only intended to deceive but also cause injury by achieving
deception, are actionable. The requirement that the plaintiff prove
proximate causation asks a much more conventional question. It
simply asks the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's proven
wrongdoing was close enough in the causal chain of events to the
injury suffered by the victim such that it could be attributable to
defendant.
To understand why proximate causation is different from
reliance in consumer fraud cases, consider Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co.'0 6
In this case, Plaintiff, a consumer of Amoco's "Ultimate" gasoline, filed
a class action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated consumers
in Illinois who purchased Amoco Ultimate gasoline. 10 7  Oliveira
alleged that Amoco had misled consumers by advertising that its more
expensive Ultimate gasoline had benefits that it did not have. 08
Amoco moved to have the complaint dismissed on the grounds that
Oliveira, as named plaintiff, could not state a claim for which relief
could be granted because he conceded at deposition that he had never
read an advertisement that contained the alleged
misrepresentations. 10 9 Oliveira's answer was that Illinois's consumer
material deceptive act or practice that caused actual, although not necessarily pecuniary,
harm"); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (stating that plaintiff in consumer
fraud action must prove that defendant's deceptive behavior was a "producing cause," "an
efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which, in natural sequence, produced the injuries or
damages" (quoting Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975))); Weinberg v. Sun Co.,
Inc., 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001) (finding that plaintiff must prove reliance and causation in
false advertising claims under Pennsylvania consumer fraud statute).
105. In the "Lights" litigation, some courts would deny that reliance and causation are, in
fact, two separate issues. See Craft v. Philip Morris, No. 002-004006A (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13,
2004).
106. 776 N.E.2d 151 (Ill. 2002).
107. Id. at 155.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 156.
[Vol.57:6:21772202
MASS RESTITUTION LITIGATION
fraud statutes did not require reliance, and thus it did not matter
whether he or some other members of the class were deceived. 110
Oliveira argued that what mattered was that because Amoco intended
to deceive some purchasers of the gasoline, and did, all purchasers of
the gasoline had to pay a higher price. That is to say, Amoco's
conduct, which was prohibited by the Illinois legislature, caused him
and others like him injury, even if that conduct did not cause that
injury through deception.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Oliveira's argument on the
grounds that, even if Illinois's consumer fraud law did not require
proof of reliance, it did require that each person who claimed injury
under it prove that his injury was proximately caused by the
defendant's violation of the law.111 The court held that if Oliveira
were to satisfy his prima facie case against Amoco, he would have to
show how Amoco's attempts to deceive the public caused him to be
deceived. 112 The court did not challenge Oliveira's allegation that he
might have paid more for Ultimate gas than he otherwise would have
"but for" Amoco's misrepresentations to the public. The court's point
was that the wrong suffered by Oliveira and the wrong allegedly
committed by Amoco were not aligned. For instance, if Oliveira had
been struck by a motorist who had made a careless left-hand turn for
no other reason than to buy Ultimate gasoline because of an
advertisement that contained a misrepresentation, Oliveira's personal
injury, although caused in a "philosophical sense" by Amoco's
consumer fraud, would not be treated by any court as actionable under
consumer fraud. Oliveira's claim for excess payments at the pump
was found likewise to have failed the test of proximate cause.
The problem with proximate cause is that it is often
fact-intensive. The inadequacy of Oliveira's complaint against Amoco
may seem obvious in retrospect, and the Illinois Supreme Court had
no trouble saying that none of the class members Oliveira represented
could survive a motion to dismiss based on the facts he pled.113 But
what about the reverse? Can a jury decide that damages were
proximately caused to hundreds of thousands of persons as the result
of the violation of the consumer fraud statutes without a case-by-case
examination of each claim? When the Minnesota Supreme Court
confronted this question in the 2001 HMO case certified for their re-
view, they ducked it. While they were confident that proof of
110. Id. at 155-56. Like Minnesota, reliance is not required under Illinois's Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (1996)





individual reliance by the HMOs was not required in order to prove
proximate cause or the "causal nexus" between violation of the state's
consumer fraud statutes and the HMOs' injuries as insurers, they
could not say what sort of proof would be sufficient. 114
The district court that certified the reliance question to the
Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately decided that the HMOs' claims
were like Oliveira's. The HMOs offered statistical proof of the effect of
smoking on the general population and argued that one could
extrapolate from this well-known public health data that the tobacco
industries' violation of Minnesota's consumer fraud statutes was the
proximate cause of an ascertainable loss to the HMOs. 115 The court
rejected this attempt:
In short, Plaintiffs' reliance on studies and surveys relating to smoking rates, disease
rates, and the medical costs associated with smoking in general could only be relevant to
causation if the Court adopted a strict liability regime in which Defendants were held
liable for all of the costs of smoking related illness regardless of whether those costs
were connected to any legally opprobrious conduct. While the holding of the court in
Group Health provides an expansive reading of Minnesota consumer protection law, it
does not endorse such a strict liability system. 
1 16
The court rejected the plaintiffs' nonindividuated proximate
causation case because it did not take into account the relationship
between the wrong alleged-consumer fraud-and the injury
suffered-increased medical expenses. The court's point was that the
causal links between the wrong and the remedy in consumer fraud
cases involving third-party payors, such as state health insurers or
HMOs, are just as complex and difficult as proving the casual links in
a subrogation or restitution claim.
Nonetheless, because of the court's 1996 statement that
individual reliance would not have to be proven in a case brought by
an insurer for damages under consumer fraud statutes, both the
states and the tobacco companies believed-wrongly, I would argue--
that even if all the other causes of action could be defeated or delayed,
the consumer fraud claims would still be the tobacco companies' Achil-
les heel.
114. Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 38-40 (Minn. 2001).
115. Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1129 (D. Minn.
2002), a/f'd, Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 763 (8th Cir.
2003).
116. Group Health Plan, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
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V. CONCLUSION: CONSUMER PROTECTION AS
REGULATION
I have argued that the tobacco companies' reasons for settling
the state reimbursement suits, complex and obscure as they were, had
a lot to do with the threat of the consumer fraud claims that formed
the backbone of many of the states' suits. My point is not that the
states' consumer fraud claims were ultimately "stronger" than the
restitution claims that have received so much subsequent (and
critical) review. As the district court's opinion in Group Health Plan,
Inc., suggests, recovery by a third party payor under the Minnesota
statute was not possible, and recovery by means of individual
lawsuits-while possible-was not a viable alternative.
My point is that the consumer fraud claims reflected a different
sort of threat to the tobacco industry, and one that bore a tighter
connection to the settlement achieved under the MSA. The states'
consumer fraud claims were weak because they merely tried to
combine under the mantle of the state or a health insurance plan the
personal injury and common law fraud claims that would otherwise
have been brought by smokers, either singly or as a class. These
claims could not be treated as identical for the same reason that class
actions based on personal injury or common law fraud failed. As a
substantive matter, wrongs relating to personal injury or deceit
depend on variables which are not susceptible to class treatment.
The elimination of reliance in certain consumer fraud statutes,
such as Minnesota's, was clearly designed to overcome one
element-from the common law tort of deceit-which would otherwise
have barred its application to large groups of victims. 117 On the other
hand, states that have eliminated the element of reliance have not
eliminated the need of plaintiffs to prove that their injuries were
"proximately caused" by the fraudulent conduct. 118 The problem, as
illustrated by the plaintiffs' loss after remand in Group Health Plan, is
that many attempts to deceive have no effect on their targets or have
only very attenuated effects on persons who were not intended to be
victims (but were foreseeable). 1 9 Unless one presumes classwide
effect, how can courts treat the proximate cause element of the deceit
in consumer fraud as a common question of fact? Presumption of
deleterious consequence-commonly known as "fraud on the
117. Group Health Plan, Inc., 621 N.W.2d at 32.
118. Id. at 34.
119. See Shannon v. Boise Cascade Corp., 208 Ill. 2d 517, 524 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing claim for
deceptive advertising because complaint "failed to allege that representative plaintiff was in any
manner deceived by defendant's advertising').
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market"-is accepted in securities fraud class actions but is explicitly
rejected by courts that have interpreted their states' consumer fraud
statutes "liberally" as not requiring reliance. 120 The individuation
problem seems to be inevitable in the context of class actions for
smoking, whether under common law or statutory consumer fraud.
What the tobacco companies may have recognized is that there was a
solution to the individuation problem when it emerged in statutory
consumer fraud law, and that this solution could result in the state
allowing suits that would serve not to repair the wrongful losses
caused by the tobacco companies' fraud, but rather to force the tobacco
companies to give up their wrongful gains.
The consumer fraud class actions can escape the
individualization problem by changing the definition of the wrong
suffered by the victims. The recent struggle in the courts over
whether to certify class actions in cases involving "light" cigarettes
illustrate this dynamic.
The litigation seeks damages for deceptive marketing of low tar
and nicotine cigarettes (known as "Lights").121 The essence of the
claims is that the tobacco companies marketed these cigarettes in a
manner that led consumers to believe that they were safer than
regular cigarettes. Plaintiffs claim that given the manner in which
users smoked Lights, they were just as dangerous as regular
cigarettes. The suits demand that the cigarette manufacturers return
to the purchasers of Lights-depending on the jurisdiction-either
their "out of pocket" losses (the difference of the price of the cigarettes
and the value of what they received) or their "benefit of the bargain"
(the difference between the price paid for the cigarettes and their
value of what was promised).
The tobacco companies have responded with a number of
arguments; however, only one is directly related to the individuation
problem described above. The defendants argue that, even if the
plaintiffs in the class do not have to prove reliance, they do have to
prove that they were each harmed by the alleged
120. See Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 156 n.1 (111. 2002) (noting that "plaintiffs
theory of causation bears marked similarities to the 'fraud on the market' theory found in federal
securities case law"); Aspinall v. Philip Morris, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 490 n.23 (Mass. 2004)
(rejecting that plaintiffs theory of liability under Massachusetts's consumer fraud statute (which
does not require proof of reliance) was a "novel 'fraud on the market' type theory").
121. See generally, e.g., Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 941 (Ill. App. Ct., 2003),
Craft v. Philip Morris, No. 002-004006A (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13, 2004); Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d 476;
Brown v. The American Tobacco Co., Inc., Order of January 21, 2005 (JCCP Case #4042, San
Diego (CA) Superior Court).
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misrepresentations. 122 A few courts have denied class certification on
this ground. 123 A slightly larger number of courts have certified class
actions and one case has already been tried. 124 The argument for
permitting class certification has been set out by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, which heard an interlocutory appeal on the
question. 125 It held that the tobacco companies' argument against
certification would "eviscerate" the Massachusetts consumer fraud
statute and thus could not possibly be within the intention of the
legislature that passed the law. 126 In order to avoid this result, the
court distinguished between the wrong suffered by each class member,
which is common to all, and the actual damages suffered by the class
members, which the plaintiff would still have to prove as to the class
as a whole and perhaps as to each member of the class. 127
This is not the place to critically analyze the Aspinall decision.
What I want to point out is how the Massachusetts court, to save its
consumer fraud statute from irrelevancy in the context of tobacco
litigation, honestly (but subtly) shifted the definition of the injury
suffered by the smokers. The court defined the injury as the failure by
the tobacco companies to deliver what they had promised. According
to the court, no one (or practically no one) who bought Lights actually
got a cigarette that performed as advertised. 28 Whether or not they
bought Lights to achieve the effect that had been fraudulently
advertised was irrelevant, since reliance is not part of the cause of
action. Whether or not they suffered actual injury is a question to be
determined after certification. According to the court, the injury arose
from the fact that the consumer purchased a product that did not do
122. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant Philip Morris USA Inc. at 16, Marrone v. Philip Morris, C.A.
No. 03CA0120.M (Dec. 3, 2003) (Lights cases are not like a "utility overcharge case where
everyone could show that the electric company charged more than what is permitted by law").
123. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hines, Case No. 4D02-941, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS
19771, at *8-*9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.); Curtis v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No. PI 01-018042, slip opn.
(Minn. Cty. Ct. Jan 16, 2004).
124. Price v. Philip Morris, No. 00-L-112 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 21, 2003) ($7.1 billion in
compensatory and $3.0 billion in punitive damages awarded). Price is now on appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court.
125. Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d at 481.
126. Id. at 489 (discussing the interpretation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A).
127. Id.
128. The court noted that there might be a very small group of smokers who "fortuitously"
smoked a Light in a way that would have produced its advertised effect, but noted that this




what it was supposed to do and that was placed into the marketplace
because the defendant wanted to deceive someone.129
The irony is that, by defining the injury suffered by the class of
consumers at such a high level of abstraction, the courts that have
allowed certification in the Lights cases have turned their states'
consumer fraud statutes (at least in the context of tobacco litigation)
into exercises of public law. Each member of the Aspinall class
claimed that they were the target of fraud. The wrong for which the
tobacco companies will have to defend themselves in the class actions
that have been certified is that they attempted (and perhaps
succeeded) in defrauding the public. These wrongs are quite serious.
But whether they have any connection to the claims in private
law-for either compensation or restitution-which characterized the
tobacco litigation that led to the MSA is something about which I am
quite doubtful.
Thus, to the extent that the tobacco companies accepted the
MSA in response to the threat posed by statutory consumer fraud
suits, the remedy to which they agreed fits surprisingly well with the
law under which they settled. The remedy described at the beginning
of this Article-the imposition of costs which, in scale, resembled
nothing like damages or reimbursement to those who were allegedly
harmed-look more like a public law remedy of penalties conjoined
with regulatory oversight. Similarly, the fact that the state-and not
the smokers-are the chief recipients of the funds might make more
sense now as well. The MSA, which looks like a private law remedy,
in fact was the result of a form of public law regulation in disguise.
129. Id. In Craft v. Philip Morris, No. 002-004006A, at 43 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13, 2004), the
judge, in a very carefully written opinion, made the same argument: he noted that unless the
cause of injury is "presumed," regardless of individual proof of injury in class certification, Ohio's
consumer fraud statute would be "eviscerated."
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